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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALICE M. ALFORD, : 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. : Case No. 880669-CA 
THE UTAH LEAGUE OF CITIES AND 
TOWNS, an unincorporated 
association; JAN T. FURNER, 
KENNETH H. BULLOCK, CAROL A. 
KOTLER, MICHELE REILLY, JAMI 
ADAMSON, JACK A. RICHARDS and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
individuals, 
Defendants-Respondents.: 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to § 
78-2-2 (3) (i) , of the Utah Code Annotated as this is an appeal 
from an Order granting defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Order was made by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge of 
the Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, on the 
8th day of July, 1988. The Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. 
DID THE COURT ERR BY FAILING TO ISSUE A 
BRIEF WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE GROUNDS FOR 
GRANTING RESPONDENTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 52(A) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE? 
It is respondents1 position that the court did not 
commit reversible error by failing to issue a brief written 
statement of the grounds on which respondents1 motion for summary 
judgment was granted. 
II. 
DID THE COURT ERR IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS1 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
It is the respondents1 position that the court was 
correct in granting summary judgment based on any or all of the 
grounds advanced by respondents. 
III. 
WERE RESPONDENTS1 ENTITLED TO CLAIM A 
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE? 
It is respondents1 position that they were entitled to 
a qualified privilege based on the associational relationship and 
the common interest in the subject matter of those involved. 
This privilege was not abused. 
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IV. 
DID APPELLANT CONSENT TO PUBLICATION OF THE 
WRITTEN STATEMENTS? 
It is respondents1 position that the appellant did 
consent to the publication of the written statements thus barring 
judgment against the respondents as a matter of law. 
V. 
WERE RESPONDENTS1 ENTITLED TO AN ABSOLUTE 
PRIVILEGE? 
It is respondents1 position that due to the nature of 
the review hearing requested by the appellant, an absolute 
privilege was established as a matter of law, allowing limited 
publication of the statements of the board members. 
VI. 
WAS APPELLANT REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH THE 
NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT? 
It is respondents1 position that appellant's claim is 
barred as she failed to comply with the notice requirement of the 
Governmental Immunity Act. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment on June 
13, 1988 (R. 91). The Memorandum in Support of Respondents1 
Motion for Summary Judgment contained four different grounds on 
which respondents were entitled to summary judgment (R. 92-121). 
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The motion was heard and argued on July 8, 1988 before 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. At the conclusion of argument 
of counsel, Judge Wilkinson granted respondents1 motion for 
summary judgment* Pursuant to Judge Wilkinson!s instructions 
respondents1 counsel prepared an order which was delivered to 
appellant's counsel on July 8, 1988 (R 314). Appellant filed her 
notice of appeal on August 4, 1988 (R 317). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Utah League of Cities and Towns is an 
organization formed by the municipalities of the state of Utah 
pursuant to the Interlocal Co-operation Act § 11-13-1, et seq. , 
Utah Code Annotated (See brief of appellant page 3). 
2. Appellant became an employee of the League on or 
about May 16, 1983. Appellant had been serving as the director 
of administrative services for the Utah League of Cities and 
Towns. After being placed on probation twice for inadequate 
performance at her employment (the first time from March 28, 1986 
to April 29, 1986 and the second time from September 18, 1986 to 
September 30, 1986), appellant was terminated on October 3, 1986 
(See Alford deposition, pp. 23-38, Furner deposition, answers to 
Requests for Production, R.294). 
3. On October 16, 1986, after having conferred with 
legal counsel, appellant requested a formal hearing with the 
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board of directors of the Utah League of Cities and Towns to 
reconsider the termination of appellant, that was effectuated by 
the appellant's immediate supervisor, respondent Jan T. Furner, 
the executive director for the Utah League of Cities and Towns. 
(See: Alford deposition pp. 83-87, answer to requests for 
production, R. 44-45). 
4. Along with the formal request for a hearing before 
the board of directors, appellant, by and through her counsel, 
made the following request for information and documentation 
concerning the reasons for appellant's termination: 
We deem it incumbent upon the League to come 
forth with specific instances of 
insubordination and unwillingness to work 
with co-workers, sufficient to justify the 
measures taken . . . 
. . . in addition, we would request that, no 
later than Wednesday, October 22, 1986, the 
League furnish this office with all the 
information upon which it claims to have 
relied in Mrs. Alfordfs termination, and 
which it intends to present to the board of 
directors during the October 24, 1986 
hearing. Specifically, we request the 
following, in writing: 
. 3. The names of all individuals who 
will be present at the hearing on October 24, 
1986 to offer statements or testimony 
regarding Mrs. Alfordfs job performance 
during her employment the League, together 
with all particulars of the statements or 
testimony which they will offer; and 
4. All particulars of any other information, 
whether written or verbal (including copies 
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of any information which has been reduced to 
writing), which the League will present to 
its board of directors in support of its 
termination decision. (Emphasis added). 
(See: R 44-45, 254-55). 
5. Prior to October 22, 1986, Jan T. Furner prepared 
a written report for presentation to the board of directors at 
the October 24, 1986 meeting pursuant to the request by-
appellant's counsel. A copy of the written report was delivered 
to the legal counsel for the appellant on October 22, 1986. 
(See: R 293-94). 
6. On October 23, 1986, counsel for appellant 
requested a copy of the contents of appellant's personnel file 
from Respondent the Utah League of Cities and Towns. This 
request was made pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 67-18-1 et 
seq. (1953 as amended), this statute making the contents of all 
personnel files for state or political subdivision employees 
available to the employees upon their request. (See: brief of 
appellant at p. 19-20, answers to appellant's first request for 
production of documents). 
7. Appellant's desire to have more specific 
information made available to the board of directors prior to 
their formal consideration of appellant's discharge was made 
crystal clear in appellant's counsel's letter to the counsel for 
the Utah League of Cities and Towns, dated October 23, 1986, 
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wherein appellant's counsel requested more specific information 
than that which had been provided by respondent Jan T. Furner on 
October 22, 1986. 
The report itself, while it 
characterizes Mrs, Alford's termination as an 
emergency response to a critical situation 
does not name a single co-worker nor describe 
a single event, to justify the charges of 
"insubordination.11 Not only, therefore, is 
the report unresponsive to my prior letter, 
it does not give the board adequate 
information upon which to base its decision 
regarding a further hearing . . . 
(See: R295). 
8. At the board of directors meeting for the Utah 
League of Cities and Towns held on October 24, 1986, after 
waiting for counsel for appellant to arrive and going into 
executive session, the board of directors considered a motion 
directing the staff of the Utah League of Cities and Towns to 
furnish documentation that had been requested by counsel for 
appellant. The motion was seconded and passed. The board moved 
for a special hearing date to be set for November 10, 1986 at 
4:00 p.m. Again, the motion was seconded and passed. The 
attorney representing appellant at the board meeting was Thomas 
P. Melloy. Mr. Melloy specifically asked for a copy of all 
written statements previously requested (See paragraphs 3 and 4 
above) from the staff of the Utah League of Cities and Towns and 
from its executive director, Mr. Furner. Appellant's counsel, 
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Mr- Melloy, agreed, or failed to disagree while aware of the 
situation, at the board meeting whereby the written statements 
would be distributed to all board members so that they would be 
prepared for the November 10, 1986 hearing. The board meeting 
minutes provide: 
Upon the arrival of Mrs. Alford's attorney, 
the board changed the sequence of the agenda. 
Mr„ Tom Melloy was introduced to the board. 
Mayor DePaulis then suggested that the 
decision be made on the issue of whether or 
not to extend a hearing, and if so, establish 
the procedures to be followed. The date of 
hearing should be set, so as to provide 
adequate time for the staff to provide the 
information requested by Mrs. Alford's 
attorney. The information should also be 
distributed to the board, so that all 
involved could be prepared. 
A motion was made by counsel member DeBoer to 
go into executive session; seconded by Mayor 
Jenkins. 
Mr. Tom Melloy, attorney for Alice Alford, 
then returned to the board room. After 
reconvening the board meeting, counsel member 
Gurrister made the motion to direct the staff 
to furnish the documentation requested by 
Alice's attorney to them as soon as possible 
and furnish a copy of the same information to 
each board member. The motion was seconded 
by Mayor Scott, motion passed. 
Mayor Linford moved the date of hearing to be 
set for November 10, 1986 at 4:00 p.m. The 
motion was seconded by counsel member 
Gurrister, motion passed. 
Mr. Melloy asked for a copy of all written 
statements originally requested by Mr. 
Rampton from staff and Mr. Furner. Mr. 
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Melloy agreed that the statements should also 
be distributed to board members; so that they 
would be prepared for the November 10 
meeting. 
(See: R128-67, 172-93, 206-30). 
9. Immediately before appellant was terminated, Jan 
Furner requested that each of the staff of the Utah League of 
Cities and Towns write down some of their concerns about Alice 
Alford to get the issues "off their chests." Respondents Carol 
Kotler, Kenneth H. Bullock and Michele Reilly, Jan Furner and 
other staff members of the Utah League of Cities and Towns, 
including David Spatafore and Don Hansen, each prepared and wrote 
down their thoughts as directed, between September 29, 1986 and 
September 30, 1986. (See: R121-27, 168-71, 191-95, 202-05). 
10. After the October 24, 1986 board meeting, 
respondents Carol Kotler, Kenneth Bullock, Michele Reilly each 
prepared supplemental statements concerning their employment 
relationship with the appellant. Other additional statements 
were also prepared by Jami Adamson, David Spatafore and Renette 
Anderson. (See: R122-27, 168-71, 193-95, 202-05, 267-71). 
11. Each of the statements prepared, as outlined in 
paragraph 9 and 10 above, were provided to appellant's counsel by 
hand delivery on October 28 and November 4, 1986. (See: R206-
09, 299-300). 
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12. On November 4, 1986, copies of each of the 
statements identified above were mailed or hand delivered to each 
member of the board of directors of the Utah League of Cities and 
towns along with a letter from respondent Jack Richards, general 
counsel for the League, explaining the statements and identifying 
the procedure which had been approved at the board meeting on 
October 24, 1986 for the hearing scheduled for November 10, 1986, 
(See: R206-09). 
13. Each member of the board of directors received 
copies of the statements in question. After receiving the 
statements in question, no member of the board of directors 
allowed anyone access to the statements nor did they disclose the 
contents of the statements to any third person. (See: R128-67, 
172-93, 206-30, 263-66). 
14. Each of the statements provided in response to the 
request by counsel for the appellant were prepared upon the 
personal knowledge and information of the persons making the 
statements. The statements were based upon personal observations 
of the people making the statements of the conduct and actions of 
appellant in this matter over a substantial period of time. Each 
person making a statement associated regularly with the appellant 
while at work. Respondent Jack A. Richards and respondent Utah 
League of Cities and Towns, received the statements from 
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respondent Jan Furner who in turn had solicited and received each 
of the statements directly from the persons making those 
statements. Each of the persons making the statements were 
instructed by respondent Jan Furner, that the statement should be 
true, that they should not be based on rumor or speculation, and 
that they must be based on the personal knowledge of the person 
making the statement. (See: R122-27, 168-71, 193-95, 202-05, 
267-71, Jack Richards deposition). 
15. Each of the statements described in paragraph 7, 9 
and 10 above, were prepared in specific accordance with and at 
the direction of the Board of Directors of the Utah League of 
Cities and Towns, pursuant to the request by counsel for the 
appellant to provide such statements. The statements were 
circulated to members of the board of directors with the 
permission of counsel for appellant. (See: R122-27, 168-71, 
193-95, 202-05, 267-71, 128-67, 172-93, 206-230, 263-66). 
16. The Utah League of Cities and Towns, an 
unincorporated association, is a political subdivision of the 
state of Utah. (See: R3, Brief of appellant page 19). 
17. Appellant never caused a notice of claim to be 
served upon or delivered to the Utah League of Cities and Towns 
pursuant to the requirements outlined in the Governmental 
Immunity Act of Utah. (See: R122-27, 208-09). 
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18. Each of the statements referred to in paragraph 7, 
9 and 10 above, were delivered to respondent Jack A. Richards in 
the course of his representing the Utah League of Cities and 
Towns and its officers, employees and agents, as an attorney. 
(See: R122-27, 168-71, 193-95, 202-05, 267-71, 206-09). 
19. The formal hearing which appellant and her legal 
counsel requested the board of directors of the Utah League of 
Cities and Towns grant to her constituted a quasi-judicial 
proceeding, not dissimilar to the proceedings described in Utah 
Code Annotated § 67-19-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) . (See: 
statute). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Respondents originally advanced four separate grounds 
in support of their motion for summary judgment. After reviewing 
the file and memoranda submitted by counsel for both parties and 
having heard the arguments of counsel, Judge Wilkinson granted 
the motion for summary judgment to respondents and in doing so 
agreed there was no genuine issue as to a material fact as 
required by Rule 56(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant waived findings by the court when her counsel orally 
consented in open court to waive a written transcript of the 
hearing on the motion. After entry of the order granting summary 
judgment, appellant failed to move the court to amend its 
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findings pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Appellant argues that there are some disputed factual 
issues in this case. In light of the advancement by respondents 
of four separate grounds for summary judgment, however, none of 
the facts appellant disputes are of a material nature. Summary 
judgment was appropriate as granted based on any and all grounds 
advanced. 
Respondents possess a qualified privilege as a matter 
of law pursuant to the associational relationship between the 
respondents and the board of directors in addition to their 
common interest in the subject matter of the written statements. 
Such statements were not made out of spite or ill will, thus the 
privilege was not abused. 
The nature of the hearing requested by appellant and 
her counsel was quasi-judicial. As such, an absolute privilege 
was established, allowing limited publication of the written 
statements to the board members. This absolute privilege 
precludes appellant's claim of defamation. 
Appellant's claim was precluded as consent constitutes 
a complete defense. Consent clearly occurred when appellant's 
counsel requested on three separate occasions, that specific 
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information be published regarding appellant's employment and 
termination. 
As appellant agrees, the Utah League of Cities and 
Towns is a political subdivision. Respondents are entitled to 
the protection of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The 
function of the Utah League of Cities and Towns is governmental 
in nature. Respondents are immune from suit as the alleged 
injury occurred during the course of employment and arose out of 
the performance of a discretionary function and involved alleged 
libel or slander pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-10. 
Alternatively, even if immunity had been waived, 
appellant was still required to comply with the notice 
requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act. Appellantfs claim 
is precluded as she failed to give notice of the claim to 
respondents pursuant to § 63-30-11 and 13 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
APPELLANT FAILED TO MOVE THE TRIAL COURT FOR 
AMENDMENT TO ITS ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 
52(B) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
THEREBY CONSTRUCTIVELY WAIVING SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS BY THE COURT. 
Appellant correctly asserts that Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure indicates a brief written statement of 
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the grounds for decision on motions granted under Rule 56 when 
based on more than one ground. Appellant contends she was left 
to guess at the reason Judge Wilkinson granted summary judgment 
in favor of respondents and is unable to specify issues on 
appeal. Appellant, however, failed to exercise her opportunity 
to move the trial court to amend or make additional findings, as 
clearly provided in Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Rule 52(b) provides in part: 
Upon motion of a party made not later than 
ten days after entry of judgment the court 
may amend its findings or make additional 
findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. 
Appellant made no attempt to follow this procedure as clearly set 
forth in the same rule on which they rely in claiming error by 
the trial court. Appellant did not exercise available options to 
obtain the information she desired, and was apparently 
unconcerned with conserving previous judicial resources. 
In her brief, appellant indicates she was left to guess 
at the reasoning for respondents successful motion for summary 
judgment, yet through her counsel, she voluntarily waived a court 
reporter and transcript at the time the motion was heard. This 
waiver, together with the subsequent failure to move to amend the 
findings, amounts to constructive wavier of specific findings by 
the court. 
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There is no Utah case law in this area of specific 
findings and motions for summary judgment. In light of 
appellant's failure to exercise all options available to her to 
discover the information she desired, she should be precluded 
from a de novo review in this court of the summary judgment 
granted to respondents as it amounts to unnecessary expenditure 
of judicial resources. In granting respondents motion for 
summary judgment, Judge Wilkinson agreed that there was no 
genuine issue as to a material fact. Respondents advanced and 
argued four separate grounds on which summary judgment was 
appropriately granted and as such should be affirmed. 
II. 
APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH DISPUTED 
MATERIAL FACTS, THUS SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE AFFIRMED FOR RESPONDENTS AS A MATTER OF 
LAW. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b) provides that 
defendants may move for summary judgment at any time. The Utah 
Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 56 is that when there is 
no dispute as to any material facts and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as matter of law, that summary judgment is 
appropriate. Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah 2d 251, 51 P. 2d 624 
(1960); Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundqren, 692 P.2d 
776 (Utah, 1984) . 
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Summary judgment may be based on affirmative defenses 
when they have been adequately plead and the material facts in 
support thereof are not in dispute. See Ulibarri v. 
Christenson, 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P.2d 170 (1954). Respondents1 
motion for summary judgment was based on affirmative defenses in 
their answer concerning consent by appellant, qualified privilege 
due to the relationship between persons making the statements and 
to persons to whom the statements were published, absolute or 
qualified privilege due to the nature of the proceeding, and the 
failure by appellant to comply with applicable provisions of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-1 et 
seq., (1953 as amended). As fully discussed below, analysis of 
the undisputed facts, together with the legal issues, establishes 
that as a matter of law respondents are entitled to summary 
judgment as to all causes of action brought by appellant. 
Appellant, in her brief contends that there are 
numerous factual issues in dispute. None of these, however, are 
material facts. Appellant cites Reeves v. Geigy Pharmacutical, 
Inc. , 95 U.A.R. 19 (Utah App. 1988), quoting language in support 
of the claim regarding remaining factual issues. The Reeves 
court, in part of their decision, found that a doctor who was 
allegedly negligent was entitled to summary judgment even in 
light of a dispute found in the evidence. The court then cited 
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, _ _ U.S. _ , 106 F. Ct. 2548, 2553 
(1986) (on motion for summary judgment, non-moving parties 
failure of proof concerning one essential element of that parties 
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial). In the 
instant case, appellant contends that factual issues exist. 
Respondents submit, however, that even if factual issues did 
exist, in light of the fourfold nature of respondents1 argument, 
such facts are not material. The court should find sufficient 
undisputed facts to reach a legal conclusion regarding any one of 
the four affirmative defenses or arguments raised. The court 
must affirm judgment for defendants and affirm a judgment of no 
cause of action against the plaintiff. 
III. 
THE ASSOCIATIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
RESPONDENTS AND THE BOARD MEMBERS, AS WELL AS 
THEIR COMMON INTERESTS IN THE SUBJECT MATTER 
OF THE WRITTEN STATEMENTS, ESTABLISHES A 
QUALIFIED PRIVILEGE AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
ALLOWING LIMITED PUBLICATION OF THE 
STATEMENTS TO BOARD MEMBERS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly established the 
common law in Utah, that when a person making a defamatory 
statement and the person to whom the statement is published have 
a common interest in the subject matter of the statement and the 
statement serves to protect the common interest, there is a 
qualified privilege for the making of that statement. Hales v. 
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Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork, 197 P.2d 910 (Utah, 1948); 
Coombs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 270 (Utah, 1951); 
Restatement of Torts, § 594; Sowell v. IML Freight, Inc., 30 Utah 
2d 446, 519 P.2d 884 (1974); Restatement of Torts, (Second), § 
596 (1977); Knight v. Patterson, 20 Utah 2d 242, 346 P.2d 801 
(1968); Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1983). 
Where the facts regarding the circumstances 
of publication are substantially without 
dispute, as here, the existence of a 
conditional privilege is a question for the 
court. 
Coombs v. Montgomery Ward & Co. at p. 274, citing Restatement of 
Torts, § 1619. Likewise, Utah statutes governing publications by 
newspapers as well as criminal defamation have all recognized the 
qualified privilege when there is a common interest in the 
subject matter between the person publishing and the person to 
whom the information is published. Utah Code Annotated § 45-2-
3(3); Utah Code Annotated § 76-9-506 (1953 as amended). 
The court must consider whether the interest held 
between the employees of the Utah League of Cities and Towns and 
the interests of its board of directors satisfy the requirements 
to establish a qualified immunity for publication of the 
statements from the employees to the board of directors. In 
that regard, the case of Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 
P,2d 395 (1977), is somewhat analogous to the undisputed facts 
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presented here. In Richardson, the plaintiff had been terminated 
from his employment with Grand Central for "negligence on his 
part resulting in loss of $1,588.00, failure to properly secure 
money box in safe." Richardson v. Grand Central Corp. at 397. 
This material was printed on the blue slip required by the Utah 
Department of Employment Security. The Supreme Court, in 
reviewing the trial courtfs granting of a motion for directed 
verdict, agreed that there was no evidence of publication of the 
information on the blue slip to anyone other than the parties 
immediately concerned giving rise to the qualified privilege. In 
affirming the trial court's decision, the court said that for 
the plaintiff to bear his burden of proof to overcome the 
privilege 
it would have to appear that the 
notations on the "blue slip" were made 
without an honest belief of their 
truthfulness or that they were made and 
published arising from spite, ill will, or 
hatred toward to the plaintiffs, or that 
there was excessive publication motivated by 
a desire to do him harm. 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., at 397. 
Likewise, another Utah case, Coombs v. Montgomery Ward 
& Co. , 228 P.2d 270 (Utah, 1951), also presented facts 
substantially analogous to those presented here. In Coombs, the 
plaintiff sued his employer for defamation based on statements 
made by a representative of the employer in investigating the 
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disappearance of a $1.50 from the automobile service area of the 
Montgomery Ward store where the plaintiff worked. The court 
concluded that there was a conditional or qualified privilege of 
the employer to discuss the missing funds with other employees 
and concluded that the commonality of interest between the other 
employees and the employer established a qualified privilege. 
The court went on to conclude that the qualified privilege had 
not been abused in that situation. In both Richardson and 
Coombs, the court recognized that the interests of employers and 
employees are the same when considering termination of co-
employees. This commonality of interest gives rise to the 
qualified privilege. 
The facts established in this matter indicate that the 
appellant herself, through her counsel requested that she be 
provided with additional information as to the grounds for her 
termination. The interest of the employer, the Utah League of 
Cities and Towns and the interest of the other employees who 
were requested to provide the allegedly defamatory statements 
were the same, that the Utah League of Cities and Towns1 decision 
to terminate appellant be upheld through the appeal process to 
the board of directors as established by affidavit and the 
original complaint. The only publication was between the 
employees who were requested to provide the statements and the 
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members of the board of directors of the Utah League of Cities 
and Town. There was no other publication of the allegedly 
defamatory statements. Based on the commonality between the 
interests of those who made the statements and those who received 
the statements, it is readily apparent that a qualified privilege 
exists between the employees and the members of the board of 
directors of the Utah League of Cities and Towns. Appellant has 
failed to adequately challenge this qualified privilege. 
Appellant's only argument in this regard is as follows: 
The right, consent or necessity of 
distributing these written statements to the 
board of directors is in dispute and should 
be submitted to a fact finder. 
The appellant has failed to recognize that as a matter of law 
there need not be consent nor necessity of publication, rather 
the board of directors was entitled to receive the information 
with a qualified privilege, based on their common interest with 
those making the statements. Clearly, the respondents have 
established, and appellant has failed to negate, that as a matter 
of law there was a qualified privilege for the communications 
between the employees and the members of the board of directors. 
This right exists regardless of consent by the appellant to the 
publication. It arose as a matter of law based on the 
associational relationship. 
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The respondents concede that there are two defenses to 
a qualified privilege. Those defenses include abuse of the 
qualified privilege by exceeding the privilege and actual malice 
established on the part of the defendants. Appellant has failed 
to argue, and is thus deemed to have admitted, that there is no 
basis upon which appellant may claim that the privilege was 
abused. The affidavits of the members of the board of directors 
demonstrate publication only within the limits of the privilege. 
The only argument raised by appellant is an attempt to establish 
actual malice on the part of the respondents. Affidavits 
submitted by each of the persons allegedly publishing defamatory 
statements indicate that they were not made in bad faith, and 
accordingly the burden of proving that the statements were made 
in bad faith shifts to appellant. 
Upon review of the cases cited in appellantfs brief, 
the court will notice that none of these cases have ever reached 
the question of malice. The courts have discussed malice as a 
potential abuse of the qualified privilege which has been 
established. The language cited by appellant from Richardson v. 
Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395 (Utah, 1977) is particularly 
important in that the case established that it is the 
publication which must arise from spite, ill will or hatred 
toward the plaintiff. A review of the facts in this matter 
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clearly establishes that the only publication alleged to be 
defamatory in the appellant's original complaint was a 
publication of the original written statements to the members of 
the board of directors. That publication arose because of the 
relationship between the board of directors as the governing body 
of the Utah League of Cities and Towns, and the status of the 
persons making the statements as employees of the League. But 
for Alice Alford's request for hearing and reconsideration of her 
termination, the publication would have never taken place. 
Accordingly, the publication did not arise from spite, ill will 
or hatred toward appellant. It arose because of the 
circumstances of the pending hearing requested by appellant and 
the common interest between the persons making the statements and 
those to whom the statements were published. 
Appellantfs principal argument is that there is a 
question of fact as to whether there was actual malice. Careful 
reading of 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, § 199 cited by 
appellant provides the following: 
the determination as to whether it 
(malice) exists as to destroy the defense of 
privilege depends, or may depend, upon the 
form upon which the defamatory words were put 
by the defendant, taken in connection with 
the knowledge or information which the 
defendant had as to the matter of the 
defamatory statements. 
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Accordingly, the court must consider what knowledge or 
information respondents had as to the allegedly defamatory 
statements. Review of the affidavits submitted by each of the 
persons making the statements establishes that they had worked 
with appellant over an extended period of time, that they were 
very familiar with her, that their statements were based upon 
their personal knowledge and made in good faith, without any ill 
will or hard feelings toward appellant. 
Furthermore, 50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, § 199 
which is also cited by appellant continues: 
the existence of malice may be 
determined by the court as a matter of law if 
only one inference can reasonably be drawn 
from the evidence. It is the duty of the 
trial judge to withdraw the issue of the 
existence of malice from consideration of the 
jury, where there is no evidence, or not more 
than a scintilla of evidence, thereof. 
Appellant then goes on to quote from the depositions of the 
persons who made the statements. Here, the court is now faced 
with the decision of whether appellant has established more than 
a scintilla of evidence of actual malice. Dominguez v. Babcock, 
727 P.2d 362 (Colo., 1986) is highly analogous to the instant 
situation and provides guidance for the court in this matter on 
how to dove tail the issues raised by the motion for summary 
judgment and the arguments raised by appellant concerning actual 
malice. 
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While only constituting persuasive authority for this 
court, this recent Colorado case is particularly illustrative of 
the Colorado court!s application of the common law of conditional 
or qualified privilege to a factual situation highly analogous to 
that presented here. Dominquez v. Babcock, supra, was decided by 
the trial court on a motion for summary judgment, similar to the 
motion granted in this matter. The Dominquez trial court granted 
summary judgment against the plaintiff based on the plaintifffs 
consent to publication of allegedly defamatory material and the 
existence of qualified privilege, requiring that appellant prove 
actual malice on the part of the defendants. The Colorado 
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling as to qualified 
privilege. 
The facts of Dominquez involved dissatisfied co-
employees of the plaintiff, Dominguez, who requested that 
Dominguez be removed from the position of head of the Basic 
Engineering Department at the Colorado School of Mines. The 
eighteen defendants prepared a memorandum demanding his removal 
as department head and requesting that he not be rehired for the 
following year. Mr. Dominguez, in response, demanded that the 
eighteen defendants be required to substantiate in writing the 
matters contained in their original memorandum. In accordance 
with the demand of plaintiff Dominguez, the eighteen defendants 
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prepared a second memorandum, going into more detail concerning 
the reasons for their request that the plaintiff not be rehired 
and that he be removed from the position of department head. 
In its analysis, the Colorado court initially concluded 
that the second memorandum prepared by the eighteen defendants 
was subject to the qualified privilege "because it was published 
by persons having a common interest in the subject matter to 
persons sharing that interest." Dominguez v. Babcock at 3 65. 
The Colorado court continued its analysis by indicating: 
[I]n balancing the interest of the defamed 
person in the protection of his reputation 
against the interest of the publisher, third-
persons and the public, in allowing the 
publication, we believe that the publication 
in this case is subject to a qualified 
privilege because the interest in employee 
and peer comment to supervisors concerning 
rehiring are of sufficient importance to 
require greater fault than negligence. 
(Emphasis added, citations omitted). 
Dominguez v. Babcock at 366. The court then considered whether 
the qualified privilege had been vitiated by actual malice of the 
defendants, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 600. The 
court pointed out that a privilege "is lost if the publisher (a) 
knows the matter to be false, or (b) acts in reckless disregard 
as to its truth or falsity." Dominguez v. Babcock at 3 66. The 
court continued: 
In responding to the defendants1 affidavits 
alleging good faith publication based on 
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personal knowledge, a plaintiff must submit 
counter-affidavits and allege specific facts, 
which if true, would raise a genuine issue as 
material fact, (citations omitted). Although 
the question of malice is ordinarily one for 
the jury (citations omitted) , a judge may 
withdraw the issue from the jury if there is 
no genuine issue concerning malice or 
reckless disregard (citations omitted) . 
Thus, the question of malice may be 
appropriate for resolution by summary 
judgment. 
Dominguez v. Babcock at 366-67. The Dominguez court concluded 
that the plaintiff had failed to establish actual malice or 
reckless disregard by indicating that: 
[H]ere the eighteen defendants were faculty 
members in Dominguezf department and had 
ample opportunity to observe Dominguez1 work. 
Where nothing in the record indicates malice, 
the qualified privilege requires a 
presumption of good faith and summary 
judgment is proper. (citations omitted). 
Thus, even if the issue of consent were to be 
decided in Dominguez1 favor, the District 
Courts granting of summary judgment was 
proper because Dominguez failed to show 
actual malice. 
Dominguez v. Babcock at 366-67. 
The issues raised in the Dominguez case parallel those 
raised here, including the issue of consent and the issue of 
qualified privilege. Likewise, the instant factual situation is 
highly analogous to that presented in Dominguez. In Dominguez, 
the plaintiff requested further documentation of the allegations 
against him. Further documentation was prepared. Here, 
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appellant requested further documentation of the allegations 
against her. Additional documentation was prepared. In 
Dominguez, the defendants filed affidavits putting the plaintiff 
to his proof by alleging that the statements were made on the 
basis of personal knowledge and information. The same has been 
done in this matter. Accordingly, the burden of establishing 
actual malice has been transferred to appellant in this matter. 
In that appellant has failed to demonstrate actual malice or 
reckless disregard for the truth, it is incumbent upon this court 
to reach the same conclusion of the Colorado court in the 
Dominguez case, that is that appellant has failed to state a 
cause of action because of the qualified immunity granted to 
respondents and summary judgment should thus be affirmed in favor 
of respondents. 
IV. 
APPELLANT'S CONSENT TO THE PUBLICATION OF THE 
WRITTEN STATEMENTS CONSTITUTES A COMPLETE 
DEFENSE TO HER CLAIMS, BARRING JUDGMENT 
AGAINST RESPONDENTS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Professor Prosser lists five situations wherein 
absolute privilege is afforded to persons publishing information 
about others. Those five situations of absolute immunity 
include (1) judicial proceedings, (2) legislative proceedings, 
(3) executive communications, (4) consent of the plaintiff, and 
(5) communications between husband and wife. See Prosser, Law of 
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Torts, 4th Edition, Chapter 19, Defamation, § 114(4). When 
addressing the issue of consent of the plaintiff, Prosser 
indicates: 
One who has himself invited or instigated the 
publication of defamatory words, cannot be 
heard to complain of the resulting damage to 
his reputation; and this is true although the 
publication was procured for the very purpose 
of decoying the defendant into a law suit. 
Id. at 784. The courts which have considered the question of 
whether consent to publication of defamatory statements is a 
defense to an action based on defamation consistently conclude 
that where consent is given by the plaintiff, it acts as a 
complete bar to recovery by the plaintiff. 
It is generally held that a publication of a 
libel or slander is insufficient to support 
an action for defamation if it is invited or 
procured by the plaintiff, or by a person 
acting for him in the matter. Thus, there is 
not a publication . . . by the answering of 
an officer of a corporation of the 
plaintiff's request for the reason of his 
discharge, or by communications concerning 
the cause of discharge, that are by an 
employer or his agent to one procured by a 
discharged employee or intercede for his 
reinstatement. (emphasis added; citations 
omitted). 
50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander, § 149. Respondents research 
has revealed no Utah cases directly on point, however, they 
submit that the Colorado case of Costa v. Smith, 601 P. 2d 661 
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(Colo. App. 1979) is illustrative of the effect of consent of an 
allegedly defamatory communication. 
In Costa, the plaintiff and defendant were attending a 
dinner party when the defendant indicated he would refuse to be a 
partner with the plaintiff. The plaintiff challenged the 
defendant by requesting that the defendant support his reasons 
why he would refuse to be a partner with the plaintiff. 
Thereafter, the defendant enumerated specific items that were 
alleged to be defamatory by the plaintiff. The court concluded 
that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action 
considering that he had consented to and indeed asked for the 
very communications which the plaintiff alleged to be defamatory. 
In accord with this proposition is the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts at section 583 which provides in pertinent 
part: 
the consent of another to the 
publication of defamatory matter concerning 
him is a complete defense to his action for 
defamation. 
When considering issues of libel and slander, Utah courts have 
consistently looked to the Restatement for guidance as to the 
common law in Utah and respondents submit that the Utah Supreme 
Court would do as it has in the past and that they would adopt 
the Restatement position regarding defamation. See generally 
Coombs v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 228 P.2d 272 (Utah, 1951). 
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Based on the above, respondent submits that the law in 
Utah would be consistent with the general principles set out 
above. If the plaintiff consents to publication of allegedly 
defamatory material, the consent serves as a complete defense 
from subsequent legal action by the plaintiff claiming defamation 
of character. 
Respondents submit that the appellant consented to the 
publication no fewer than three times. Initially, in her letter 
prepared by her legal counsel dated October 16, 1986, the 
appellant clearly requested: 
[A] 11 particulars of any other information, 
whether written or verbal . . . which the 
League will present to its board of directors 
in support of its termination decision. 
After having received the initial report prepared by respondent 
Furner, appellant again requested, on October 23, 1986, more 
specific information relative to what the Utah League of Cities 
and Towns would present to its board of directors to support the 
termination of appellant. 
Appellant then requested additional information again, 
by and through her legal counsel, at the meeting of the board of 
directors held October 24, 1986. After meeting in executive 
session and after having passed motions to furnish additional 
documentation and to set a hearing date, appellant's counsel 
agreed that the additional written statements to be prepared 
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should be provided to appellant and her counsel and that said 
statements should be distributed to all members of the board of 
directors of the Utah League of Cities and Towns to facilitate 
and encourage adequate preparation for the hearing scheduled for 
November 10, 1986. 
In her brief, appellant contends that there was a 
factual dispute as to whether appellant's counsel, Thomas P. 
Melloy, requested or approved the distribution of the written 
statements from the League employees to the board of directors. 
The minutes of the meeting of October 24, 1986 indicate that Mr. 
Melloy agreed to the distribution of the statements. In his 
affidavit, Mr. Melloy states that he did not agree to the 
distribution but also failed to object to such distribution of 
the statements to the board members. Mr. Melloyfs purpose in 
being at the board meeting was to represent Mrs. Alford. As 
such, it was his duty to object to the distribution if necessary 
to protect appellant's interests. 
Any one of the three requests by appellant to have 
information published relative to her employment experience would 
be adequate under the legal principles established above to allow 
the court to conclude that appellant consented to publication of 
the allegedly defamatory statements. However, as discussed 
above, appellant consented to the publication on three separate 
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occasions. The publication of the allegedly defamatory material 
was accomplished in strict accordance with the agreement and 
consent given by the appellant, that being that the written 
statements be prepared and circulated to members of the board of 
directors and to appellant's counsel. As established by 
affidavit, no named respondent, nor any member of the board of 
directors exceeded the explicit instructions concerning 
publication of the allegedly defamatory material. 
The cases and other legal authorities cited by 
appellant relating to consent are all distinguishable from the 
case at hand. In each and every situation cited by appellant, 
the alleged defamatory statement was being investigated or 
inquired into. In this matter, the only publication of an 
allegedly defamatory statement was the publication of the 
statements made by the employees to the members of the board of 
directors. These are the only defamatory publications claimed by 
appellant. In her complaint, appellant never claimed, and at 
this point on appeal should not be allowed to claim, that the 
statements made in the initial decision to terminate appellant 
constituted defamatory material. In Berger v. Minnesota Mutual 
Life Insurance Company of St. Paul Minnesota, 723 P.2d 388 (Utah, 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that where an argument is not 
properly presented to the trier of fact below, it will not be 
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considered for the first time on appeal. In the instant case, 
appellant in her complaint alleged only that defamatory 
publication occurred between the statement makers and the board 
of directors. 
The original decision by Jan Furner to terminate 
appellant and the reasons therefore were never published to any 
third person, making those original allegedly defamatory 
statements non-actionable. In this case, as is established by 
appellant's complaint, the first publication, and indeed only 
actionable publication, is that between the employees of the 
League and the members of its board of directors. Appellant did 
not properly present or argue any other theories of defamation in 
the trial court and should not be allowed to rely on these on 
appeal. 
The new theory appellant advances on appeal involves a 
series of cases which appellant contends suggest by analogy that 
appellant did not consent to the defamation. This group of cases 
finds actionable slander or libel where an employer made 
defamatory statements to an employee knowing that the employee 
would have to himself publish the defamatory statements. This 
approach has been adopted by a few jurisdictions as cited by 
appellant. See Lewis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 389 N.W. 2d 
876 (1986, Minn.); Neighbors v. Kirksville College of 
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Osteopathic Medicine, 694 S.W. 2d 822 (1985, Mo. App.); First 
State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W. 2d 696 (1980, Tex. Civ. App., Corpus 
Christi); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 168 N.W. 2d 389 (1969 Mich.). 
The cases relied on by appellant are easily 
distinguishable from the instant situation in that each of the 
cases appellant advances in support of her new theory involved 
situations where the plaintiff actually published the defamatory 
statements to subsequent perspective employers, thereby 
sustaining injury. In the instant case, appellant has never 
alleged that she published the allegedly defamatory statements. 
To adopt this somewhat absurd legal theory, as appellant 
suggests, would burden society in general, and specifically 
employers. Employers need to be protected when exercising their 
discretionary task of hiring and firing employees. Providing 
discharged employees, especially upon request, with reasons for 
their termination should not subject employers to legal action 
for defamation. Generally, the reasons for terminating an 
employee are not positive or complimentary in nature. If each 
time an employee was discharged by his employer and given the 
reasons for the discharge, a potential action and defamation 
arose, the courts would be bogged down with a new breed of 
lawsuits. 
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Respondents submit, that as appellant did not properly 
present and argue this issue in the lower court, she should not 
be allowed to advance the new theory on appeal. The defamation 
alleged by appellant below involved the alleged publication 
between makers of the statements and the board of directors of 
the Utah League of Cities and Towns. Appellant, through her 
counsel, not only consented, but requested publication of the 
alleged defamatory statements on three different occasions as 
discussed above. As such, summary judgment for respondents 
should be affirmed as a matter of law. 
V. 
THE NATURE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS REVIEW 
HEARING REQUESTED BY APPELLANT ESTABLISHED AN 
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
ALLOWING LIMITED PUBLICATION OF THE 
STATEMENTS TO THE BOARD MEMBERS. 
As indicated in part IV above, Professor Prosser 
includes judicial proceedings as another area that establishes an 
absolute privilege allowing publication of defamatory statements. 
As expressed in 50 Am. Jur. 2d under the topic of Libel and 
Slander at § 193 and 194, absolute privilege is afforded 
participants in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings based on 
public policy. 
Absolute privilege is confined within narrow 
limits, and the tendency of and policy of the 
courts is not to extend such limits unless 
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the public policy on which privilege is based 
is found to exist in new situations . . . 
50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander § 194. Particularly, witnesses 
must be afforded protection from civil liability based on 
defamation of character in order to promote adequate and truthful 
disclosure by witnesses of all material matters before the 
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized this absolute 
privilege. Dodge v. Henriod, 21 Utah 2d 277, 444 P.2d 753 
(1968); Wright v. Lawson, 530 P.2d 23 (Utah, 1975). The legal 
question then remains whether the review hearing requested by 
appellant would fall within the definition of a judicial or 
quasi-judicial proceeding, with afforded absolute immunity. In 
the instant case, it is important to note, that appellant has 
conceded that the Utah League of Cities and Towns is entitled to 
and subject to the protections of Utah Code Annotated § 67-19-1 
et seq. (1953 as amended), more commonly known as "the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act". Appellant requested a copy of her 
personnel file pursuant to the provisions of § 67-L8-1, Utah Code 
Annotated. Appellant, through her counsel, also requested a 
formal hearing by the board of directors of the Utah League of 
Cities and Towns. Sections 23 and 25 of Chapter 19 of Title 67, 
Utah Code Annotated explain in detail the procedures to be 
followed by Utah State employees in appealing decisions made by 
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their employers concerning their employment. When comparing the 
proceeding that was to take place, that is a review hearing by 
the board of directors of the Utah League of Cities and Towns, 
with the procedures outlined in the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act, it is apparent that the nature of the hearing 
requested was quasi-judicial. 
All parties agree that appellant did request a formal 
hearing to review any evidence that would support or contradict 
the termination of appellant from employment with the Utah League 
of Cities and Towns. Had the hearing indeed taken place, as 
requested by appellant, the contents of the statements of the 
employees would have been published to members of the board of 
directors regardless of whether there had been agreement to 
provide the statements to members of the board of directors in 
advance of the hearing. Appellant's legal counsel wanted to know 
what would be presented to the board of directors and appellant's 
counsel was provided with exactly what would be presented to the 
board of directors. 
Respondents have found no Utah authority for the 
proposition that a quasi-judicial proceeding entitles witnesses 
to absolute immunity from civil liability for defamation of 
character. However, the universal position of other 
jurisdictions is that quasi-judicial proceedings are entitled to 
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the same absolute immunity. See e.g. Hurst v. Farmer, 40 Wash. 
App. 116, 697 P.2d 280 (1985). 
The written statements were published in direct 
anticipation of and in preparation for the hearing to be held by 
the board of directors. Without question, they were published in 
the course of and related directly to the hearing requested by 
appellant. 
Another position taken by some courts, when it is 
questionable whether a proceeding actually constitutes a judicial 
or quasi-judicial proceeding, is that participants have a 
qualified privilege or immunity from civil liability for 
defamation. For example, § 2 06 of 50 Am. Jur. 2d under the 
heading of Libel and Slander annotates cases relating to lodges, 
unions and societies and their proceedings with relation to 
members thereof. Likewise, at § 207 also under the heard of 
Libel and Slander, annotations are provided as to investigation 
of labor grievances between employers, employees and labor 
unions. Again, at § 208 annotations are presented relating to 
religious and church matters and proceedings associated 
therewith. In each of these types of proceedings, the courts 
have concluded that a qualified immunity applies, exonerating 
civil liability to publishers of allegedly defamatory 
information. Should the court conclude that the hearing with the 
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board of directors does not fall within the absolute privilege of 
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, the court should afford a 
qualified privilege to respondents based on the fact that the 
proceedings is highly similar to other types of proceedings that 
have been found by courts to be afford a qualified immunity. 
Considering that the board of directors was to convene 
a hearing with respect to the decision regarding the termination 
of appellant, the public policy supporting absolute privilege to 
participants in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings applies 
to the situation at hand. Indeed, it would have been in 
appellant's interest to have the employees be honest and 
truthful and fully disclose everything they knew about appellant 
and her employment with the Utah League of Cities and Towns to 
help the board of directors render a fair and equitable decision. 
Respondents submit that the nature of the proceeding 
requested by the plaintiff and the statements provided in 
preparation therefore and distributed and published as a result 
thereof, require absolute immunity or privilege and accordingly 
preclude appellant's claim for relief. In the alternative, the 
defendants submit that the nature of the proceeding clearly 
provides a qualified privilege or immunity for respondents to 
publish the allegedly defamatory material. Regardless of how the 
court resolves this issue with respect to what type of proceeding 
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was to be conducted, it necessarily follows that the summary 
judgment granted to respondents should be affirmed by this court. 
VI. 
APPELLANT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, ENTITLING 
RESPONDENTS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
As a general matter, governmental entities are immune 
from civil suit for the exercise of governmental functions. See 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-3 (1953 as amended). Governmental 
entity is defined in § 63-30-2(3) as "the state and its political 
subdivisions . . . ." Appellant, in her brief, acknowledges that 
respondent is a political subdivision. As a political 
subdivision or governmental entity, respondents are entitled to 
immunity from suit under the Governmental Immunity Act. 
The function of the Utah League of Cities and Towns is 
governmental in nature. A key case on the issue of governmental 
function is Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 605 P. 2d 1230 
(Utah, 1980). The Standiford, test for governmental functions 
refer to activities that "can only be performed by a governmental 
agency". In Standiford the court concluded that the 
municipalities operation of a golf course was not a governmental 
function. The Utah Supreme Court also concluded in Johnson v. 
Salt Lake City Corp. , 629 P.2d 432 (Utah, 1981), that operation 
of a golf course was non-governmental in nature. In Thomas v. 
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Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah, 1982), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that operation of a sewer service was non-governmental 
in nature as privately provided sewer services would be 
essentially the same. In Cox v. Utah Mortgage and Loan Corp., 
716 P. 2d 783 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
supervision of disbursement of escrowed funds was not a 
governmental function as it was not of a unique nature only to be 
performed by a governmental entity. 
The instant case involved a governmental function, and 
can be distinguished from the above cases involving non-
governmental activities. All of the above cases involve 
functions which can be carried out by private entities with 
substantially the same results. In the case of Utah League of 
Cities and Towns, however, no group of private individuals would 
be an adequate substitute for the group of political officials 
involved. In Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983), the 
Utah Supreme Court concluded that governmental supervision of a 
financial institution was an activity of such a unique nature 
that it could only be performed by the governmental agency, thus 
a governmental function. The Utah League of Cities and Towns as 
a group has a uniqueness that no one else can duplicate, thus 
their function is governmental. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-4 provides: 
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(3) The remedy against a governmental entity 
or its employee for an injury caused by an 
act or omission which occurs during the 
performance of such employees duties within 
the scope of employment or under color of 
authority is, . . . exclusive of any other 
civil action or proceeding by reason of the 
same subject matter against the employee or 
the estate of the employee . . . 
Respondents in the instant case were all acting within the scope 
of their employment. Mr. Furner was acting in a discretionary 
capacity of firing an employee. The people making the statements 
were asked at work to write down their feelings regarding 
appellant. Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-10 provides for waiver of 
immunity in certain circumstances, except where a claim: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused; or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false 
imprisonment, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of 
process, libel, slander, . . . 
Appellant's claim clearly falls within the exceptions to the 
waiver of immunity for discretionary functions or Libel or 
Slander and are thus immune from suit. 
Alternatively, even if immunity were waived, appellant 
was still required to comply with the notice requirement pursuant 
to § 63-30-11 through § 63-30-13 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
before bringing a civil action. 
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The notice of claim shall set forth a brief 
statement of the facts, the nature of the 
claim asserted, and the damages incurred by 
the claimant so far as they are known, shall 
be signed by the person making the claim or 
such person's agent, attorney, parent or 
legal guardian and shall be directed and 
delivered to the responsible governmental 
entity in the manner and within the time 
prescribed in . . . § 63-30-13 as applicable. 
Utah Code Annotated § 63-30-11(3) (1953 as amended). Section 63-
30-13 requires service or delivery of the notice of claim within 
one year after the claim arises. Courts have consistently upheld 
the validity of the notice of claim requirement. See Yates v. 
Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah, 1980); Brown v. 
Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 P. 570 (1908) (decided under 
former law); Dahl v. Salt Lake City, 45 Utah 544, 147 P. 622 
(1915) (decided under former law). The undisputed facts suggest 
that there has been no written notice of the claim filed and no 
formal written notice of this claim has been delivered to the 
Utah League of Cities and Towns within the prescribed statutory 
period. 
Considering the immunity outlined above and 
the lack of waiver, the Utah League of Cities and Towns 
and its employees are immune from civil suit pursuant to 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Alternatively, 
appellant failed to provide a notice of claim as 
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required by law and the court must conclude as a matter of law 
that summary judgment for respondents should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The legal arguments addressed at length above combined 
with the undisputed facts lead to the single conclusion that 
appellant has failed to state an actionable claim for defamation 
as a matter of law. Respondents have established four 
independent legal grounds supporting this conclusion. 
Based on the foregoing, respondents respectfully 
request that the court affirm summary judgment in their favor as 
to the causes of action asserted by appellant against 
respondents. Appellant has failed to raise a genuine issue as to 
a material fact thus entitling respondents to affirmation of 
summary judgment as a matter of law. 
DATED this /3 day of February, 1989. 
MORGAN, SCALLEY 8c READING 
Stephen/G. Morgan 
?odd S. Richardson 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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